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The cultural dilemma for a constitutional self predicated on Kantian principles drama- 
tically emerged in the period between the wars. Perhaps it has been best described by 
Georg Lukacs who saw in it the apotheosis of a "power-protected inwardness" rendering 
null and void whatever lucidity remained in Kant's notion of public enlightenment. This 
newly formed juridical self provides the foundation for a "decisionist" ontology whose 
romantic nationalism replaces theology with secularized st?te law. The sovereign nation 
thereby does away with its theological-political pantheon (monarch, church, and estates), 
while continuing to buttress its claims to legitimacy on a simulacrum of the mythical 
framework political theology provided. The constitution of self-enlightened modern states 
therefore depends both on the juridical constitution of public selves (through which cer- 
tainties of class, status, and ethnicity give way to a purely formal calculation of rights), 
as well as on a certain mythical residue thanks to which this merely formal incorporation 
may continue to lay claim to critical substance and historical legitimacy. 
Constitutions are now the linguu frdncu of written law, the public documents by means 
of which nations will themselves into being. The functional task they face is one of 
producing a differentiated or pluralistic identity out of distinct peoples, religions, and 
traditions, as well as providing the medium by means of which newcomers, literate and 
illiterate alike, are integrated into the body politic. Within this framework, that creoliza- 
tion of cultures which goes by the name of multiculturalism does not so much contest 
the authority of the Rechtsstuut as service it. Typically, the constitutional nation creates a 
bureaucratic class whose task it is to implement liberal modernity's peculiar version of 
republican values, even as it raises its symbolic authority monatchically above federalist 
principles. However, the universalization of human rights, whose guarantor the nation- 
state takes itself to be, can only take place within an evolving collective identity. This 
identity eliminates -"sacrifices" in a Hegelian sense - particularist communities to the 
social whole, while maintaining an idealistic posture toward a national culture. Insofar as 
this idealism contains a welfare-orientation toward property rights and ownership, taxa- 
tion, and equality for women, children, labouring adolescents, and the aged, it acts as an 
instrument that contains a social charter without explicitly naming it  as such. 
The historic debate on the Canadian constitutional referendum (Charlottetown Accord, 
1992) provided an unprecedented opportunity for a deepening of a modern human 
rights discourse in the public sphere - particularly insofar as such rights find themselves 
inflected by the conditions described above. On 13 January 1992 the Canadian national 
newspaper, The Globe and Mail, published '1 Constitutional Primer," an eight-page sup- 
plement on constitutional reforms in Canada. Pierre Elliott Trudeau's repatriation of 
the constitution was there archly scorned as a "magical mystery tour," and the proposed 
amendments similarly described as an exercise in mystification. This is not suprising 
when we consider that the separation of the question of aboriginal rights (as well as the 
social charter) from the question of "distinct society" status for Quebec guaranteed the 
banality of the civics lessons these amendments invited. The segmentation of rights, laws, 
and culture that surrounded discussion of both the Meech and Charlottetown accords 
ensured that the logic of Canada's particular historical development would be perceived as 
an irrational legacy of an aberrant, unfinished past. It was assumed that the only impedi- 
ment to Canada's taking its place on the world-historical stage was its inability to produce 
technocratic-consumerist solutions to that resistance to integration evinced by interests at 
once traditional and particularist. This is the late-capitalist message of bread first and 
rights later - an ideologically coloured worldview that passes as progress. Any discussion 
that included attention to Canada's history of institutionally sanctioned racism was neatly 
jettisoned: Francophobia, immigration policies toward Jews, the internment of Japanese 
Canadians and confiscation of their property, street violence against dark-skinned peoples, 
the treatment of native peoples, all this was absent from the debate. 
Another historical example of nation-building tied to constitutional authority is at 
hand if we examine the debates over the establishment of the Basic Law of Germany 
in 1948-49. The issue of a federal system and a democratically secure and culturally inte- 
grated Germany was mediated through the question of whether Germany should be con- 
sidered a protectorate or an ally. The debate was resolved (or rather effaced) in favour of a 
culture of stable consumerism, just as today questions of unification (whether in Germany, 
Canada, or the former Soviet Union) are treated in terms of how satisfied "the people" 
are with their standard of living, and how much they are willing to forget the issues of 
the past in order to maintain a culture of welfare and affluence. 
The logic of building a constitutional self depends upon the integration of culture 
(civilization in its particularistic historical forms) with society in both its economic and 
communal forms, and morality in its atomized or absolute forms. As a consequence of 
the erosion of the self in modernity, customary-experiential norms (Kant's Sittlichkeit- 
Erfahrung) are represented by the trials of the power-protected individual. It falls to civilly 
administered society to "work through" these problems.' The economic and technocratic 
solutions to the problem of community formation arising from such a "society" reveal 
the failure of the constitutive power of Enlightenment ideals to transcend the pathogene- 
sis of its own origins. Seen from this perspective, the struggle over who controls and 
makes legitimate the historical narratives that enable us to imagine, write, and apply con- 
stitutions is not only a political question that becomes theoretical when viewed in terms 
of the finality of the question of judge-made law, it is also a question of how to under- 
stand a fully participatory activity of social legitimation and self-adequation that would 
not allow itself to atrophy in a process of ehztisation. Here it is instructive to recall that the 
law of "state of emergency" deployed by the Nazis - a law resulting in the disappearance 
of even a semblance of a free public sphere - was enacted precisely in order t o  protect the 
nation and state against the threat of anarchization. The history of official collaboration of 
legal professionals and intellectuals in the establishment of the one-party state in prewar 
Germany is a well-known object lesson in modern tyranny. However, it has been less 
readily perceived that the underlying reality was the accomplishment of a dictatorship 
over everyday life achieved by means of a "revolutionary" elimination of federalism and 
the establishment of a state whose legal sovereignty was - in principle at least - global. 
Canadian history offers a useful counterpoint to this state of affairs, instructive both 
for its similarities and its differences. Trudeau is famous for having accused of intellectual 
treason those who put nationalism (whether of Anglo or of French separatist vintage) 
above the rights of particular historical actors. This stance was itself grounded in a cul- 
tural ideology that took shape between the wars, "a transitional period in world history." 
Trudeau's view that the nation is the 'guardian of certain very positive qualities.. . {such 
as) cultural heritage, common traditions, a community awareness, historical continuity, 
a set of mores" is based on the subjective culture of the inward-looking person who is 
"more private than p ~ b l i c . " ~  This inwardness is a refuge for instinct and primitive self- 
centredness - according to Trudeau, pretty much all we have left. In 1971, Trudeau chose 
to invoke the War Measures Act to defend a federalist concept of a constitution. However 
misguided this move might have been (and we are entitled to ask what sort of "inward- 
ness" would remain in the face of such measures), it is nevertheless clear that the emer- 
gency act was invoked in the name of federalism as the guarantor of a polyethnic culture, 
and not in the name of the reactionary ideology of national sovereignty. That said, the 
question which Trudeau's functionalist solutions beg is as follows: Do the very mecha- 
nisms by means of which Canadian federalism guarantees the integration of cultural and 
ethnic diversity not at the same time guarantee the political inconsequentiality of ethni- 
city? That is, does the formal equality guaranteed to diverse cultures by the state not 
empty those cultures of their historically elaborated social and political functions, leaving 
them with nothing but a purely imaginary or specular significance? 
The romance at the heart of the utopian realization of constitutions allows that constitu- 
tions are not symbolic acts of governments but are virtual forms of reality. They are forms 
of participation in which citizens judge governments. As such, they can be considered as 
forms of participatory epic. They are perhaps best described in literary-linguistic terms as 
threshold documents that show where the limits of power lie. They reveal the border sep- 
arating the public agora (in which constituted public selves can become active in protect- 
ing their individual and collective rights) from a consensus-forming private sphere whose 
borders cannot be reached constitutionally. The partitioning of the self into separate cate- 
gories of private and public selves can be visibly recognized in the compacts and agree- 
ments that are offered up in the name of official consensus. 
There is an important reality-forming aspect here, one which contains Kantian essen- 
tials: a condition of dialogue. Kant's emphasis is not on officially constituted selves, but 
on the constitution of public selves, and the embodiment of these selves in dialogical self- 
governing activities. 
I t  is the apparent impossibility of preserving these same activities in juridical and 
political institutions that informs the critique of the administrative-order state that can 
be discerned in any number of thinkers working in Germany between the wars, Hannah 
Arendt and Theodor Adorno being but two examples. But it is Car1 Schmitt who best fits 
Lukacs's and Thomas Mann's image of an imperial self who cannot make the transition 
from law to emancipation from the state without giving in to sublime resignation about 
the collapse of Eurocentric  value^.^ Schmitt's cast of mind was critical, destabilizing, and 
disenchanted - he was, in short, a perfect modernist who surrendered to an unquenchable 
desire to interpret the law. The despair lurking just beneath this positivist legalism mani- 
fests itself as a crisis regarding the masses: "The crisis of the modern state arises from the 
fact that no state can realise a mass democracy, a democracy of mankind, not even a 
democratic state. Bolshevism and Fascism by contrast are, like all dictatorships, certainly 
anti-liberal but not necessarily antidemocratic."* 
In German, Schmitt's book is entitled The Intellectzlal-Historical Plight of Contemporary 
Parliamentarism, and as a cultural critique of democracy it is an attempt to provide a high- 
minded, trans-moral critique of Weimar politics.5 In his critique of the openness of 
Weimar, he looked at the modern age as a dead montage of specious democratic impulses 
and enfeebled legalisms. According to Schmitt, modernity after World War I maintained 
an image of legality and republicanism by substituting information for knowledge, and 
by creating the techniques to publicize the deeds of the politically active agents. Schmitt 
sees through the myth of public opinion, but in doing so he equates the public sphere, or 
sociality, with the intellectual consequences of liberal publicity, that is, the perils of party 
power and voting. Schmitt saw the bourgeois public sphere as inimical to his belief in 
the charismatic power endowed in legal guardians of the law (a politicized judiciary that 
could determine who was friend and who was enemy, and a sovereign authority elected 
by "the people" and who could dissolve parliament in an emergency). Any concept of the 
self grounded in human rights is therefore absent from his work.6 
Schmitt's arguments notwithstanding, a language of human rights is emblematic of 
the constitutive acts of autonomy, and cannot be limited to official discourses about emer- 
gency powers.' The Kantian Wall that guards the public sphere from institutional co- 
optation stands at the juncture of melancholy and freedom where the critical spirit cannot 
comply with the rule of bad laws. The notion of a public self capable of self-constituting 
acts of rebellion against the legalistic-technocratic "manufacture of consent" cannot exist 
in Schmitt's world of legally steered reason. Of course, the critique of a manipulated 
public opinion existed on the left and the right, but Schmitt's scorn for liberal parliamen- 
tarianism requires the weakening of the right to publicity enshrined in the at once nor- 
mative and polyvalent potentialities built into language itself. His positivism cannot 
account for the process of inner colonization required of those who must internalize the 
charismatic power that teaches obedience to the state. 
The specific engagement with the plight of human rights in the extraparliamentary 
documents of our times is a legacy of Enlightenment philosophy's confrontation with the 
status of persons. Those documents open the officially constituted democratic social forms 
to scrutiny by showing how social formations have become asocial and have been inter- 
nalized as normality - that is, as officially constituted imaginary legal selves inclined to 
justify authority and states. Within this 'genre" of juridically engaged literatures it would 
be necessary to include taboo-breaking essayistic novels like Robert Musil's The Man 
without Qmlities, as well as seditious works like James Joyce's Ulysses or Jaroslav HaXek's 
The Good Soldier Schweik. The genre arguably comes to fruition in Franz Kafka's stories 
and novels, where the law is actually the subject of almost every work. Bertolt Brecht's 
direct attacks on bourgeois law and its notion of the imposition of emergency measures as 
the basis of both capitalist and fascist ideologies provide one of the clearest aesthetic 
examples of an examination of the transformation of politics into state-sanctioned law. 
Finally, we would have to include postwar works like Hannah Arendt's Eichmann in 
Jerusalem or Bruno Bettelheim's The Informed Heart. All these works can be described as 
anti-epics whose political kernel is revealed in their concern to preserve the human char- 
acter of rights claims against technocratic legalism. 
If epics are the record of a struggle of memory to retain its connection to the speakable 
past, then we should recognize the modern epical-social impulse: a desire to dislocate 
historical time (with its unbroken, seamless connection to the authority of the victors) in 
order to introduce situations that affirm particularity, illegality, and the illegitimacy of 
means. In this intervention, the efficacy of abstract justice is denied and the connection of 
natural rights to natural history is broken.' 
Historically, we are describing a genre that isolates objects in order to show their 
internal laws: everything has a history of its own. The interrelationship of many histories 
and many cultures is disclosed in the epic impulse to be a storyteller who tells the truth 
in times of emergency, and who stands outside of the law, not within it. The storyteller finds 
ways to relocate his or her audience, to reposition their perspective in such a way as to 
displace the self-evidence of the present. In that atmosphere of forgetting in which mod- 
ern listeners bathe, the storyteller's narrative cannot fail to take on the lawful - rather 
than legal - tonality of parable. Such narratives represent a kind of parody of customary 
forms of knowledge wherein canonic laws and traditions are distanced but not extin- 
guished, even as their deterioration into positive law is r e ~ e a l e d . ~  
FORENSIC THERAPY AND MASTERING THE PAST 
Car1 Schmitt's work and its relevance to understanding the historical plight of European 
civilization in the inter-war and postwar periods should be placed within the context of 
a larger counter-republican conservatism that lasts well into the twentieth century. It 
surfaces in a variety of antiromantic forms in the struggle of conservatism to separate 
itself from either a Nietzschean or Spenglerian pessimism. This restless hostility 
toward modern democracy takes many forms, for example Weber's historical sociology 
or the post-Frankfurt School critique of modernity as advanced by Jiirgen Habermas, 
Claus Offe, or Oskar Negt and Alexander Kluge. The authority of the critique derives 
from a rereading of Marx, Freud, and Hegel, and is, as in the case of T.W. Adorno, 
worked through a profound affinity with Kant. The inner core of this critique of mod- 
ernity is informed by the dialectic of the secularized Enlightenment in its post-Kantian 
attempts to establish the Rule of Law and the government by men as substantially 
identical projects, namely, to establish Kant's utopian "Universal Peace with Cos- 
mopolitan Intent." 
Schmitt's jurisprudential, cultural role is significant, if only in the extent to which it 
provokes a recognition of an intellectual type expressive of romantic ideology. I t  is pre- 
cisely this romantic ideal that is portrayed in Thomas Mann's Dr. Faustus. Mann's work 
describes the subject who longs to leave subjectivism and theology behind in order to 
glimpse their "beyond" in the world of objects. 
Schmitt's hostility to democracy (particularly in its parliamentary forms) is too com- 
plex for any exhaustive treatment here, but his struggle for a definition of a jurisprudential 
European identity required more enemies and adversaries than either the unequal strug- 
gle between Germans and their internal foes, the Jews, or between Germans and their 
external enemies, the rest of Europe, could affect. Schmitt's real enemies were none other 
than those who could not meet the ideals of Romanized-Christianized Europe. They were 
the cultural Bolsheviks, the liberal parliamentarians, the positivist lawyers, and all the 
compensatory mechanisms in bourgeois democracy that compromised the superlegality of 
legal revolutions (the Reich) and the granting of emergency powers to sovereigns. 
Speaking in the aftermath of the genocidal fury of the Nazis' final solution, Schmitt 
comments on how the "enlightened revolutionaries" of 24 June 1973 protected against 
pozlvoir constituant becomingpouuoir constitzle'(Artic1e 28 protects the constitutional order 
of the Federal Republic).1o Schmitt is apparently more concerned with the potential tri- 
umphalism of constitutional laws that will "subjugate future generations" than with 
whatever problems might arise for human rights interests by reason of the German Basic 
Law of 1948. He fatalistically remarks that the concept of world patriotism lurking behind 
such a triumphalism is beyond the capacity of mankind because it can only be incorpo- 
rated by means of a concept of legal revolution. His apologia for his own "existential" 
position in regard to the deadly capacity of humanity to eradicate oppositions is that our 
dependence on the model of the French Revolution for both legal and illegal revolutions 
- and the impediment to the establishment of postrevolutionary models of legality that 
that dependency presented - reveals a weakness in humankind for asymmetrical struc- 
tures of legality where adversaries are excommunicated from the very humanity that is 
defended on the basis of a "patriotism of the species." The irony of the analysis lies in 
what it reveals about his own Gnostic attitude toward the libertarian-constitutional roots 
of participatory processes. 
Schmitt, along with other believers in the hegemonic state in the twentieth century, 
abandons any hope of reviving the Kantian legacy of the autonomous ethical individual. 
He is left with astute, worrisome theorizing about just and unjust wars, about the absence 
of a concept of the just enemy, and with vague Spartan lamentations about the end of the 
epoch of states.'' By grounding his worldview in a Eurocentric view of the decline of civi- 
lization - his theories are marked by the strong explanatory power of arguments of histor- 
ical decline - we can easily see that his immanent analysis of legal doctrines leaves behind 
any sense of the progressive enlightenment of historical peoples. 
Schmitt's work, and the recent revival of interest in him in the United States and in 
Germany, can be understood by placing him within the debates about understanding the 
experience of a "loss of reality" since World War I. Schmitt continues to trace the loss 
of legality as synonymous with the loss of our ability to trace reality back to the~uspub- 
licum Ezlropaeum which is his imaginary juridical meta-state. However, his own "plight" 
does not lie so much in disappointment over not realizing the meta-state, as in wanting 
to equate the legal state with "the cultural edifices built by the European spirit" whose 
"significance is no less than that of those great works of art and literature usually identi- 
fied as the sole representatives of the European spirit."12 His method of analysis reduces 
historical-cultural works to documents, thus extinguishing their dialogical and interactive 
reality. In particular, it excludes consideration of the possibility that the "cultural edi- 
fices" may not adhere to the spirit of the age, but speak against it. It is important, how- 
ever, to accept Schmitt's stricture that law cannot stand apart from cultural creation. 
But here we are not focusing on art, or aesthetics, but on law and federalism, and how 
modern societies interpret and decide rights and law. Schmitt's inability to provide us 
with a culturally sensitive context for the Basic Law of 1949 is instructive in its absence. 
Let us see why. 
The rebuilding of the German state after the two wars reshaped thinking about 
democracy, but in doing so it also situated constitutional debates and the crises of federal- 
ism within the cultural contexts of historical decline. Thus it is imperative to understand 
how the politics of historical decline obscure the dialogical conditions that form the basis 
for the reception of law. It is only by doing so that we can render problematic how the 
state can claim to speak for the future. 
The Leviathan modernist state produces wealth but also disinherited orphans of the 
Enlightenment. The German student of state power Reinhart Koselleck describes in his 
1959 book, Critique and Crisis: Enlightenment and the Pathogenesis of Modern Soczety, the 
structures of circularity and barbarism mediated by bourgeois "utopian self-assurance." In 
their Enlightenment phases, nations that emerged from feudalism into the forensic utopia 
of Roman law obliterated the dissonances and asymmetries of premodern European cul- 
tures by means of the juridical formulas of equality.13 Kosseleck's description of a postwar 
period of European reconstruction, a period under whose shadow we are still living, might 
be used as a norm for a "post-theological age" where we can neither "reconcile nor justify 
politics and morals." We are, he writes, "sucked into an open and unknown future, the 
pace of which has kept us in a constant state of breathlessness ever since the dissolution of 
the traditional stZndische [estate] societies."'* 
At the same time that Germany finds moral reconciliation and economic recovery in 
the Basic Law, the utopian search for a nonalienated "ethics" whose political dimension 
would be irreducible to Soviet-style communism or consumerist economies was expressed 
by Ernst Bloch in his Natural Law and Human Dignity. Bloch's text, which places social law 
against the loss of natural law, offers an interesting counterpoise to Schmitt's work. Bloch 
remarks that whereas "social utopian thought directed its efforts toward human happi- 
ness, natural law was directed toward human dignity."15 His question of questions is: Can 
there be both an art of ruling and an art of culture-making that together form an expres- 
sion of hope during epochs when revolutions are betrayed and when the weak have no 
will to resist? 
The Blochian-Kantian ideal wants us to walk with an "upright stance" - to go beyond 
Luther and toward Thomas Miinster. Is there a nonalienated, critical standpoint that 
accompanies this stance? Bloch's answer was to distance himself from a war-created self 
that turned the "ought" of Kant's moral imperative into a legal Reich or into Stalinism. 
Art had always distanced itself from barbarism, but in modern times it must likewise dis- 
tance itself from the rationalizing impulse in order that it might rescue the self from the 
barbarity of what Weber termed the charisma of instrumental ends.16 
I t  is therefore from the perspective of a literature committed to illuminating natural 
rights that Bloch viewed the separate horizons of law and political power (the ultimate 
conflict of wills residing in the "drive toward calculability" of modern law). He recognizes 
that the closer the two horizons come to one another, the more distant, as with all ideal 
forms, they become. Thus, the more the Kantian question of "hope" recedes from our his- 
torical standpoint, the more legalistic does the horizon appear. The question, unresolved 
in the postwar period of judicial and ultimately incomplete de-Nazification, was whether 
the war really brought an end to the culture that produced this false se l f -~~s tem.~ '  
DR. FAUSTUS A N D  T H E  LAW O F  M U S I C A L  REGRESSION 
In Thomas Mann's Dr. Fuwtzls, which appeared virtually in the same year as the establish- 
ment of the Basic Law, the artist Adrian Leverkuhn boldly creates a false-self system con- 
structed from his insatiable need to redeem art from its isolation from community and 
the people. His quest is to build "an art without anguish." His inability to master his aes- 
thetic impulses illuminates how Mann indicts his own generation's nasty habit of forget- 
ting the past; it is also a statement that defines his art as a personal project of constructing 
a modernist text that would never allow him to forget his own past. Mann's modern epic 
was completed at the end of the war, and in retrospect it asked much the same question 
that the Israeli court asked itself in its refusal to convict the simulacrum of Ivan the Terri- 
ble, John Demjanjuk: What will be put in place of culture if the institutions of culture 
have been compromised and purged of all human connections and humane responsibili- 
ties? Here the implication is clearly that subjectively depoliticized artistic texts are not 
human utterances. The "community-forming belief" that subscribes to the notion of the 
end of history is bitterly described: 
A jurisprudence that wished to rest on popular feeling and not to isolate itself from the commu- 
nity could not venture to espouse the point of view of theoretic, anti-communal, so-called truth; 
it had to prove itself modern as well as patriotic, patriotic in the most modern sense, by respect- 
ing the fruitful falsum, acquitting its apostles, and dismissing science with a flea in its ear.'' 
A clearer statement about the role played by the Rule of Law in modernity could not 
be found: Mann's work refuses to defend the autonomous self; his epic does not produce 
an image of a self that has mastered the past, but shows how both the naively epic voice of 
the narrator and the cynical voices of the musicians of the soul are rooted in ajiuzlrisprzlden- 
tiul logic that has penetrated into intimate human emotions with a ruthlessness hitherto 
unknown. Aesthetic self-consciousness-in-the-making masters its own pathogenic irre- 
sponsibility while producing from second nature dissonances that are harmonized by the 
presumed unity of the work of art as a cultural artefact. 
Mann's epic not only comes to terms with the author's own history, it also bears witness 
to the reality of the collective myths of his times. At the same time, Dr. Fuastas bears 
witness to the loss of artistic powers of representation when freedom of expression has 
itself become a self-justifying abstraction insulated from "really existing reality." Mann's 
work, however, does not only document aesthetic estrangement from the subject matter 
of art, but it also documents the feelings of the world-historical strangers who have been 
left unprotected from the law. The loss of home, the dispersion of peoples, disenfranchise- 
ment, expulsion, expatriation, exile, resettlement, asylum: Mann gives us an image of 
the nomad as an emblem of modern consciousness. In a manner that parallels those idioms 
of abstraction characteristic of prewar art (Cubism, collage, etc.), Mann represents the 
new culture of homelessness throughout Europe by mediating exile through the musical 
inwardness that longed for a release of political energies. 
Art, the law, and modern institutions all face a reality that speaks like ideology, and 
ideologies that look like reality; this becomes the normative context for the unequal rela- 
tionship between art and reality, what is often called the loss of art's representational 
capacities. Thus the continuing tendency on the part of post-Enlightenment attempts to 
"master the past" without an ethical norm or standpoint to make of the epical traversal of 
time and space something closely resembling a museum tour. In like manner, the search 
for an adequate human rights discourse is condemned to find its historical models locked, 
in the words of Ernst Bloch, in a "museum of antiquities." 
A bifurcated, power-protected legality gave us reason to suppose the entire world was 
"totalitarian." The postwar fascination with totalitarianism, whether in Orwell, Arendt, 
or wishful thinking about the end of ideology, failed to constitute an imaginary constitu- 
tion of the human-and-natural-rights nexus. Roman law provided the juridical constitu- 
tion of bourgeois society with a functional imaginuire which, pruned of symbolism and 
ritual, would allow transactions to take place on the basis of the one-sided rationality of 
legal institutions, but this did not provide an acceptable politics of human rights that 
would allow people to create self-reflective, self-critical, and historically comprehensible 
judgements of the past. The pervasive and almost aphasic loss of meaning in Mann's Dr. 
Faustus becomes, then, the "democratic deficit," when individuals cannot overcome the 
guilt over their estrangement from the cultural objects in their own history. Mann coun- 
ters an archetypal "Schmittian" world order by submitting it to the test of human under- 
standing, but he does not argue the case for a different future. 
A historical-intellectual context for federalism and a constitution-embedded human rights 
can be conceptualized through the Kantian dialogical framework that underlies the Ger- 
man Basic Law, a constitution that became the model for other nations in the modern age 
(Spain and Japan, for example). However, we risk nayvet6 if we ignore the extent to which 
the complementary logics of the market and the constitutionally protected state compro- 
mise that framework. 
In modernity the social contract that would assure us of more than recipe-oriented 
positive law requires that we imagine law as more than authority, power, instrumentality, 
and domination. I t  has been characteristic of post-Enlightenment literature not only to 
question law, and take up a libertarian-insubordinate attitude to states (freedom from 
authority) but also topurticulurize the law as an obstacle to understanding. What is, on 
one side of the equation, law, is, on the other side, the broken identification with law. 
Dostoevsky, whose works are the deepest fractures in any monolithic utopia of natural 
rights based on the present, declares: two plus two does not equal four, but equals minus 
one - the elimination of the person. 
In sketching certain historical-philosophical attitudes that take law as the high road 
to partisanship at a time, 1949, when the establishment of the German Basic Law literally 
brought Germany into a new federation with Western constitutionalism, I have claimed 
that this is one of the epical events of our time. But it is not epical in the heroic sense that 
Kant abjured. I t  is epical because today, even though it is a "monument" of cultural cre- 
ation, it is already lost in time and space: for epics - that is, the recordings of experiential 
norms, taboos, and myths by means of which the law maintains it relationship to collec- 
tive memory - cannot exist in any credible aesthetic form that represents the public 
sphere. The lawmaking power of myths and epics are superseded by the ravages of politi- 
cal struggles carried out in the name of a legalism to which real persons are subjected. 
Insofar as modernity transforms the epic sojourn into Kafka's law of process without end, 
Kafka is our modern Homer. 
Seen from the perspective of the works of Weber or Mann, Freud or Kafka, the Basic 
Law is certainly a kind of coda placed at the end of two world wars. The companion work 
to the Basic Law is Thomas Mann's Dr. Fuustus. Insofar as this novel reminds us of the 
unreliability of historical memory, it recalls to us the incapacity of modern discursive 
arts to create a structure in which a formal literate document, law, can communicate the 
shape of the collective destiny of a people. 
Mann's target is the very idea of an Enlightenment self that believes in the ideals 
of diversity, polyphony, and individuation in the arts, but is unable to imagine or connect 
this polyphony to a pluralism touched by human rights. For when legality without 
law is transformed into a jurisprudence whose sole guarantor is the State, then legitimacy 
(Gesetzmassigkeit) becomes righteousness without right, natural law without civility. 
To be sure, we live in a world where codes and constitutions shelter the principles of 
modernity along with the rights of private and separate individuals: constitutions built 
in the name of an evolving federalism maintain the bourgeois individual as an ideal type 
for this kind of reality building, while at the same time undermining the reliability of 
this person as a model for peace or coexistence. In addition to pointing to the dangers of 
idealizing this New Person as the adequate bearer of law, I have argued that constitution- 
building, which is primarily an attempt to fulfil the promise of Enlightenment - progres- 
sive historical consciousness - is also an attempt to stop time. When law abandons 
responsibility to its past, it works in collusion with the state and its economic steering 
mechanisms to deny such continuities that organize our experience of collectivity. 
We might go so far as to say that constitutions are those myths - peculiar to our moder- 
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nity - which enshrine irreversibility as a principle of historical movement. As such, they 
display a tendency - constitutive rather than contingent - to remain indifferent to the 
plight of those peoples who live outside of history, whose destinies remain, as yet and per- 
haps always, unnarratable. 
We can end on one of Mann's dissonantly utopian references to his age's inability to 
find a political form that is suitable to a people's particular needs. The narrator of the life 
of Adrian Leverkuhn notes that he has stopped writing on 25 April 1945 while still argu- 
ing for the credibility of some kind of patriotism, but not of this kind: "Ah it is no longer 
in question that this beaten people now standing wild-eyed in face of the void stand there 
just because they have failed, failed horribly in their last and uttermost attempt to find 
the political form suited to their particular needs."19 Seen in retrospect we might say that 
the American federalist experiment, and the example of the German constitution, both of 
which are based on republican principles steeped in Rousseau, Paine, and Kant, are all 
that we have for a human rights-based politics. Yet the "particular needs" that underlie 
participatory democratic forms remain as vulnerable as ever. 
For Mann, along with other intellectuals of his generation (in particular those who saw 
the continuities of German history through the lens of the aestheticized politics of the 
National Socialist regime), there could be no positive answer to the question of how legal 
continuity with the past can be constitutionally realized. Mann's critical cynicism is a 
more accurate measure of the future than views which assumed that by simply constructing 
a constitution, problems of the past - both political and cultural - would cease. At the 
same time that the cultural-experiential abyss was opened by the failure of Cold War 
negotiations to establish a peaceful sovereign state system, Mann reopened the Kantian 
question of the positive law's excommunicated moral dimension. Perhaps his was a surer 
indication of the future than assumptions that economic order would cure the past and 
redeem the present. 
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